Wednesday, February 22, 2017
7:30 PM - 10:00 PM (ET)
PALMTN Davis Auditorium
Event Type
Lecture
Contact
518-580-5593
Department
Special Programs
Link
http://ems.skidmore.edu/MasterCalendar/EventDetails.aspx?EventDetailId=15513
Spinoza’s ‘Atheism'
The charge of atheism
was brought against Spinoza by both his Christian contemporaries, and many of
his eighteenth century readers (such as, F.H. Jacobi). In our times, Spinoza
became a cult figure in certain circles due to his alleged atheism. In my paper,
I will argue that Spinoza deserves neither the praises nor the condemnations
bestowed upon him, and that the view of Spinoza as an atheist relies on a
narrow minded conception of the divine in anthropomorphic terms. Relying on an
analysis of both the TTP and the Ethics, I will argue that the
chief claims of both works are unintelligible under the assumption of Spinoza’s
atheism. I will further argue that the textbook version of the so-called
“orthodox conception of God” (whose existence Spinoza denied) is an instance of
conceptual colonialism, i.e., the uncritical application of the categories of a
hegemonic culture (in this case, Western Christianity) on marginal cultures
(here: Rabbinic thought).
Yitzhak Y. Melamed is
the Charlotte Bloomberg Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Johns
Hopkins University. He holds an MA in philosophy and the history of science and
logic from Tel Aviv University, and a PhD in philosophy from Yale University
(2005). He has been awarded the Fulbright, Mellon, and American Academy for
Jewish Research Fellowships. Recently, he has also won the ACLS Burkhardt
(2011), NEH (2010), and Humboldt (2011) fellowships for my forthcoming book on
Spinoza and German Idealism.
Melamed works at the intersection of philosophy
(primarily metaphysics), Jewish and religious studies, the history of science,
and the humanities in general. He focuses on foundational questions, which he
aspires to approach with both philosophical and historical rigor. In
particular, he is interested in well-argued views that are commonly treated as
“counter-intuitive”; such views, he believes, may help us challenge our own
well-fortified beliefs, force us to motivate what we deem to be obvious, and
reveal our conceptual blind spots. To that end, he studies bold past philosophers
(e.g., Spinoza), and less familiar theoretical analyses (e.g., Rabbinic
thought), which may not only expand our philosophical imagination, but also
help us develop a more inclusive attitude to philosophy and its history.